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I. Introduction
During the last few years our system for the administration of justice has
evolved at a revolutionary pace. The crime rate has risen,' but the basic
questions remain the same. What conduct should be made punishable?
What should be done with those found guilty of prohibited conduct? What
kinds of procedures should society permit to be utilized in the investigation,
apprehension, and disposition of persons accused of crime?2
Today, however, the answers to some of these questions are less clear, or
quite different from those answers which would have been generally ac-
ceptable less than a generation ago. Some of the premises which underlie
our system for the administration of criminal justice are being reexamined
in the light of empirical data previously unknown or ignored. Experi-
mentation is taking place in areas where change has been traditionally
regarded as anathema. The virtues of some of the ancient institutions of
the criminal process are being reevaluated. Some procedures which have
been tolerated for centuries have been discarded. States have been required
to modify customary practices to insure the observance of federal con-
stitutional rights. Research on a national scale is destroying myths con-
cerning offenders, victims, and the nature of criminal conduct. There is a
growing awareness that the characterization of some types of cases as
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ered to the Southern Regional Education Board Seminar on the Administration of
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1. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1966, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1967). THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 14-41 (1967); 2 GRIM. L. RPTR. 2228 (1967).
2. J. MICHAEL &: H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 6, 18 (1940).
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"criminal" or "civil" is less significant than the issue of what type of sanction
is being exerted against the citizen by the state, and the rights which a
citizen should be permitted to exert under such circumstances. Our system
for the administration of justice is truly in a state of transition.
I. Reform in the Substantive Law
A lawyer of a generation ago would feel much more at home today if called
upon to deal with the substantive criminal law than if he were required
to deal with the field of criminal procedure. In the substantive field, the
reformers are still largely voices crying in the wilderness. A few modern
codes have attempted to remove some of the technicalities which confused
the law, such as the distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, and false
pretenses,3 but there has been little disposition to accept proposed reforms
in more controversial areas.
Consensual Sexual Offenses
Many scholars question the wisdom of attempting to punish consensual
sexual conduct committed by adults in private-adultery, fornication, homo-
sexuality, sodomy.4 They argue that these laws are historical relics of an
era in which the law attempted to punish conduct deemed to be sinful or
immoral and have no place in a modem pluralistic society.5 In addition,
they assert that these laws are rarely enforced, and attempts at enforcement
tend to promote conduct by the police which is unacceptable to society,
such as invasions of privacy by secretive surveillance and psychological
entrapment by vice officers. 6 The prestigious American Law Institute (A.L.I.)
determined not to punish consensual sexual conduct by adults in its Model
Penal Code,7 and recently, both the Houses of Commons of the United
Kingdom and of Canada have reached similar conclusions.8 However, the
3. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.20
(Supp. 1967).
4. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION [WOLFENDEN
REPORT] 9-10, 20-21, 24, 79-80 (British ed. 1957); Symposium on Sex Offenses, 25 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 215-375 (1960); Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the
Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County,
13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 643 (1966); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior, the Re-
quirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 581
(1967); Ploscowe, Report to the Hague: Suggested Revisions of Penal Law Relating to
Sex Crimes and Crimes Against the Family, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 425 (1965); Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 669 (1963); cf. Cutler,
Sexual Offenses-Legal and Moral Considerations, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 94 (1963).
5. Ibid.
6. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
100-03 (1966).
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
8. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1967, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1967, at 3, col. 1.
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arguments of the opponents of our sex laws have generally fallen on deaf
ears in the state legislatures of the country.
A bortion
Attempts to liberalize the abortion laws have usually shared a similar fate,
but a consensus seems more likely to develop in this area. In September
1967, an International Conference on Abortion sponsored by the Harvard
Divinity School brought together clerics, doctors, lawyers, and other inter-
ested citizens to discuss the wisdom of changes." It seems likely that some
states will liberalize their laws to permit abortions where the health of the
mother requires, where there are strong medical reasons to believe that
the baby may be defective, and where pregnancy results from rape or
incest. North Carolina,10 Colorado," and California12 have amended their
abortion laws during the last year.
Business Crimes
A gradual appreciation that too much is being expected of the criminal
law in the regulation of business activities is also developing. 13 Many of our
laws proceed upon the assumption that the best or only way to discourage
undesired business conduct is to make that conduct criminal. Consequently,
our codes contain many business offenses, frequently misdemeanors, which
sometimes are dead letters on the statute books, and more frequently, are
punished by fines, which are viewed by the corporate defendant as one of
the costs of doing business which ultimately will be transmitted to the
consumer.14 There are usually other and better ways than the criminal
law to persuade businesses to abstain from undesired conduct and there are
more effective institutions to regulate businesses than the criminal courts.
Use of powers such as cease and desist orders, injunctive relief, licensing,
and taxation is available and probably will be used to a greater extent in
the years to come. The sophisticated society of the sixties requires judicious
9. See 1 CRIM. L. RPfR. 2351 (1967).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
11. Colo. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 190, § 5.
12. Cal. Laws 1967, ch. 327.
13. See Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197 (1965); Kadish, Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30
U. CHi. L. REV. 423 (1963). Cf. Harrison, Penal Actions for Trademark Infringement:
A Survey of Statutes and Cases, 57 TRADEMARK REP. 285 (1967); Egan, Criminal Eco-
nomic Law and Consumer Protection, 1967 J. Bus. L. 26.
14. See, e.g., 36 Stat. 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 39 (1964) which makes it a misdemeanor
for a railroad to fail to comply with its statutory obligation to issue a monthly report
to the Interstate Commerce Commission of all collisions, derailments or other accidents,
and provides a penalty of not more than $100 for each offense, and for each day that the
report is late.
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use of the many different types of societal sanctions which are available
to encourage conduct deemed to be desirable and to deter conduct thought
to be contrary to the public good.15 The criminal law approach of com-
bining prohibition with punishment has the virtue of simplicity, but lacks
the flexibility necessary to deal with the broad field of business activity in
which regulation is required.
Criminal Responsibility
Perhaps the greatest controversy in recent years revolves around the issue
of criminal responsibility. This broad subject includes within its ambit
such diverse issues as the effect of a defendant's mental condition on sanc-
tions imposed, the responsibility of juveniles, and the status of chronic
alcoholics and dope addicts.
The law's attempt to wrestle with these problems frequently involves a
type of circular reasoning. On the one hand, a decision that a person should
not be held responsible necessitates the conclusion that he has not com-
mitted a crime, and hence should not be punished, although his condition
may be such that he should be treated. On the other hand, if it is
premised that a class of persons should be treated rather than punished,
there is a tendency to conclude that members of the class should not be
held responsible for their acts. At the same time, most students of modern
penology accept the thesis that one of its purposes is the rehabilitation of
offenders who have been determined responsible. Thus, a theoretical conflict
sometimes arises over whether a defendant should be held responsible and
rehabilitated, or held not responsible and treated. In some cases the actual
disposition of the offender may be the same. If convicted he may receive
psychiatric treatment within the prison system; if found not responsible, he
may receive similar treatment in a mental hospital.16 The stigma attached
to his status, however, may differ.
Unfortunately, prison systems frequently have no facilities for dealing
with the defendant's mental problems. A determination of responsibility
followed by incarceration temporarily prevents a defendant from commit-
ting an offense, but when released, his underlying mental condition will
soon manifest itself in repeated criminal conduct. The classic examples are
the chronic alcoholics who throughout their lives receive sentences of $30
or 30 days, interspersed between drinking bouts. The issue of mental re-
sponsibility reaches its greatest significance in capital cases where the deci-
sion as to responsibility may determine whether a defendant is hospitalized
or hanged.
15. See R. ARENS & H. LAsswELL, IN DEFENsE OF Pimuc OR= (1961).
16. See Green v. United States, 351 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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This is not the place to discuss the defense of insanity in detail. All juris-
dictions recognize that it is unfair to apply the sanctions of the criminal
law to a person who is not responsible for his acts because of a mental ill-
ness, disease, or defect. It is common knowledge that during the last fifteen
years the courts and legislatures of many states have reexamined the
M'Naghten Rule17 and the "irresistible impulse test,"' 8 the traditional
standards of criminal responsibility, in the light of the controversy engen-
dered by the Durham Rule19 and the proposals of the American Law In-
stitute.20 The literature on the subject is extensive and a definitive work
in the field has just been published. 21 It is sufficient for present purposes
to note that a trend towards reform is clearly indicated. Three state courts
and four federal courts of appeal have adopted the A.L.I. standard without
legislation. 22 Six other state legislatures have enacted statutes which follow
the A.L.I. model with minor variations in language. 23
An appreciation that there are people incapable of controlling their con-
duct because of their mental condition is also evidenced in recent court
decisions dealing with drug addiction and chronic alcoholism. In 1962, in
Robinson v. California,24 the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed
17. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
18. Cf. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
19. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In Durham, Chief Judge
Bazelon argued that there were some individuals who were not responsible for their
acts even though they could perceive the difference between right and wrong. The
court held that a person should not be subjected to the penalties of the criminal law if
his act "was the product of a mental disease or defect." The test was two-fold: (1) Did the
defendant have a mental disease or defect at the time he committed the act? (2) Was
his act the product of his mental disease or defect? "Mental disease or defect" was
subsequently defined as including "any abnormal condition of the mind which substan-
tially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior con-
trols." McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The principal
impact of the Durham rule has been the impetus it has given to reexamination of the wis-
dom of M'Naghten which are still being conducted. In addition, it has sparked fundamental
reappraisals of the nature and purposes of the criminal process. See Bazelon, The Concept
of Responsibility, 53 GEo. L.J. 5 (1964).
20. The MODEL PENAL CODE provides in § 4.01:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
Cf. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
21. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); see also R. SIMON, THE JURY AND
THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
22. 1 CaM. L. RPTR. 1021 (1967).
23. Ibid.
24. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). For commentary on this case, see 51 CALIF. L. REv. 219 (1963);
Note, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 122 (1962); McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term, 76
HARV. L. REV. 54, 143 (1962). See also Broder & Merson, Robinson v. California:
An Abbreviated Study, 3 AM. CaM. L.Q. 203 (1965).
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a California statute which punished narcotic addiction. The Court concluded
that addiction to narcotics was a disease and held that punishment of the
defendant for addiction constituted the imposition of a cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 25 The
Court distinguished the California statute which punished the accused for
his "status as an addict" from other enactments which punish a person for
the use, purchase, sale or possession of narcotics, or for antisocial or dis-
orderly behavior resulting from their administration. 26 Prosecutions for
these offenses, which involve "irregular behavior" or "antisocial conduct"
have continued, despite claims of cruel and unusual punishment and asser-
tions that addiction constitutes a mental disease which entitles a defendant
to a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.2 7
In the Robinson case, the Court intimated that the states could compel
addicts to accept treatment for their affliction even if it could not label
addiction a crime. This dictum has given considerable impetus to enact-
ment of drug addiction commitment statutes. Many states have for some
time authorized the commitment of addicts in the same manner as the
mentally ill, but few addicts have in fact been committed.28 In 1961, Cali-
fornia passed a special statute dealing with the commitment of addicts29
and since the Robinson opinion, New York,3 0 Massachusetts,8 1 and the fed-
eral government have enacted similar measures. 3 2
As Professor Dennis S. Aronowitz has recently pointed out,83 these new
statutes are essentially similar in philosophy and approaches. All permit the
involuntary commitment of persons addicted to drugs who are neither
charged with nor convicted of crime. Under all programs except that of
California, some addicts charged with crime may volunteer for commit-
ment in lieu of standing trial on criminal charges. Furthermore, addicts
convicted of crime, with some exceptions, may be committed by the courts
for treatment instead of being sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Addicts
committed under these acts will receive treatment initially in specialized
centers and later as outpatients. Proponents of these statutes believe that
25. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
26. Id. at 664-67.
27. See Bowman, Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Durham, 53
GEo. L.J. 1017 (1965).
28. Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (1967).
29. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 3100-11 (West 1966).
30. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 206 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
31. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. llA, §§ 3-7 (Supp. 1966).
32. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438; 42
U.S.C. § 3411 (Supp. 1967), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
33. Aronowitz, supra note 28. The paragraph which follows is paraphrased from Pro-
fessor Aronowitz's excellent article. See also In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793,
28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963).
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addicts can be cured of their psychological dependence upon drugs by such
treatment programs.
In 1966, the rationale of the Robinson decision was extended by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which, on the
ground of cruel and unusual punishment, overturned a North Carolina con-
viction of a chronic alcoholic for the offense of public intoxication. 4 Public
intoxication was viewed as the "involuntary symptom" of the "status" of
chronic alcoholism.3 5 Unlike the California statute involved in Robinson,
the North Carolina statute did not punish a status per se. North Carolina
made no attempt to punish the defendant for being a chronic alcoholic. He
was punished for appearance in public while intoxicated. Nevertheless, the
court considered the defendant's public drunkenness and chronic alco-
holism so intimately connected as to be inseparable. The fourth circuit case
has been followed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 0 The issue of whether the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for
public drunkenness violates the eighth amendment is now before the Su-
preme Court.8 7
The fourth circuit and the District of Columbia cases were careful to
point out that states could provide for the detention, treatment, and re-
habilitation of alcoholics. The cases simply preclude criminal conviction for
conduct symptomatic of the condition of alcoholism. Most states have a
long way to go before there will be adequate facilities for the treatment of
alcoholics whose imprisonment may be prohibited by the Constitution.
The subject of the apprehension, trial, and disposition of juveniles after
the Gault8s and Kent 9 decisions is beyond the purview of this paper.40
It is sufficient to note that the disposition of juveniles, the insanity defense,
the cases involving drug addiction and chronic alcoholism, civil commit-
ments of the mentally ill, and the sexual psychopath laws of some of our
states all have elements in common. They constitute a divestment of the
criminal law of cases formerly falling within its cognizance. Indeed, some
34. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
35. The Driver case has been subjected to critical analysis in Note, 54 GEo. L.J. 1422
(1966). See also Note, 1966 DuKE L.J. 545; Note, 15 CATHOLic U.L. Rav. 259 (1966);
Note, 44 N.C.L. REv. 818 (1966).
36. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); See Note, The Criminal
Responsibility of Chronic Alcoholics, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 470 (1967). See also Starrs, The
Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law Theory, 19 S.C.L. REv.
349 (1967).
37. Powell v. Texas, prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 810 (1967) (No. 405).
38. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
40. See Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reap-
praisal, 53 VA. L Rv. 1700 (1967).
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astute commentators, such as Professor Nicholas Kittrie,41 have regarded
the trend as a movement towards the therapeutic state in which treatment
replaces punishment as the central instrument of social control. Such
conclusions may be premature, but it does seem clear that the criminal law
of tomorrow will refrain from imposing sanctions upon several classes of
people who engage in antisocial activities and who traditionally were sub-
ject to its rigors. Society will be required to develop other institutions
such as rehabilitation centers for alcoholics and addicts to deal with the
problems caused by such persons. The failure to develop such institutions
will create a substantial danger to the public if the antisocial actor cannot
be imprisoned.
Creation of such new institutions will also require careful consideration
of the kinds of procedures which should be used in determining which
persons should be committed, the length of their commitment, and the ex-
tent of treatment within the institution, if the rights of the mentally ill, the
juvenile, the addict, and the alcoholic are to be protected.4 2 Edward de
Grazia's admonition that "medicine can be a sort of punishment, sans due
process of law," 43 must, after all, be remembered. The treatment centers
of the therapeutic parens patriae must protect individual rights as in a
punishment-oriented criminal system. Already one court has decided that it
will examine whether an involuntarily committed patient is actually being
treated, when a deprivation of liberty is sought to be justified on thera-
peutic grounds.44
III. Dispositional Alternatives
The question of what disposition should be made of offenders continues
to be a major problem in administering criminal justice. Today it is gen-
erally accepted that the punishment imposed should be tailored to fit the
offender as well as the crime. Attempts to apply the maxim, however, fre-
quently clash with the circumstance that the criminal law has several
purposes and that any given sentence may not be able to effectuate all of
them equally. Modem criminal law has among its objectives retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and community education.45
41. Kittrie, The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic
State, I SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 43 (1967).
42. See Penegar, The Emerging "Right to Treatment"--Elaborating the Processes of
Decision in Sanctioning Systems of the Criminal Law, 44 DENVER L.J. 163 (1967). Cf.
F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964).
43. De Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 355 (1955).
44. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Note, Civil Restraint, Mental
Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 76 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
45. J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 115-24 (11th ed. G. Williams 1957); L. HALL &- S. GLurci,
CRIMINAL LAW AND IS ENFORCEMENT 14-17 (2d ed. 1958).
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Some modern scholars claim that rehabilitation of offenders is the principal
purpose of the criminal law and that the system has no place for the
concept of retribution,46 but few would deny that deterrence is still a
principal aim of punishment.4 7 Some behaviorists would question its ef-
ficacy, but as Professor Norval Morris has recently reminded,48 we really
know very little about it.
A major problem is that the purposes of punishment must be closely re-
lated to the causes of crime, and little is known about crime causation.
Criminologists and psychiatrists offer competing theories.4 9 Too often law-
makers pay attention to neither. It was a great disappointment to many
observers that the National Crime Commission did not attempt to study
the subject in depth.r0
In addition, inadequate facilities or resources frequently preclude any
realistic efforts at rehabilitation. A rehabilitation-oriented judge may think
twice before ordering probation for a youthful offender when he knows
that the probation officer is poorly trained, his caseload already excessive,
and his department without funds for psychological or psychiatric assist-
ance. 51 Furthermore, Dean Francis A. Allen has effectively demonstrated
that the rehabilitation ideal has inherent limitations. 52
Often a judge himself will have to determine what particular purpose of
the criminal law should be given precedence when he attempts to in-
dividualize the offender's punishment. A doctor found guilty of tax evasion
is unlikely to repeat his crime, but a suspended sentence may not provide
the desired discouragement for other potential tax evaders. Hanging a
murderer will not rehabilitate him, but it certainly prevents recidivism. A
lengthy sentence to a youthful car thief is unlikely to reform him, but an
indefinite sentence to a special rehabilitation center may achieve good re-
sults and have a deterrent effect equal to that of the sentence of imprison-
ment.
46. See Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 21 MOD. L. REV. 117 (1958);
Bazelon, The Concept of Responsibility, 53 Gro. L.J. 5 (1964).
47. Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949
(1966); Tappan, Who is the Criminal? 12 AM. Soc. REv. 96 (1947).
48. Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 627 (1966).
49. Cf. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 51-62 (6th ed. 1960);
H. BARNES & N. TETRs, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 206-09 (3d ed. 1959).
50. Cf. A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 17-18 (1967).
51. See Bazelon, supra note 46, at 9-10.
52. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CliM.
L.C. & P.S. 226,226-29 (1959). See also F. ALLEN, supra note 42.
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Sentencing
The multipurpose nature of our system 53 may preclude consistency in pun-
ishments, but it does not follow that reform in the sentencing process is
impossible. In the first place, sentencing alternatives available to judges
can be broadened, and their access to information relevant to sentencing
can be improved. Judges can be educated concerning standards which
should be applied. The scope of appellate review can be broadened in
order to meet the problem of individual abuse of discretion.
These ideas are not new. Both the American Law Institute Model Penal
Code and the Model Sentencing Act drafted by the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency reflect an appreciation of the importance of these
goals. Today, however, there are new signs of progress. The Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and Review of the American Bar Association Project
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice has recommended standards
which, if accepted, would constitute substantial reforms in the sentencing
structure and policies of many state courts. The Committee recommends
that the judge, not the jury, should impose sentence. 54 The legislature
should not set a specific sentence to be imposed on an offender without
regard to the particular circumstances of the case; rather, it should provide
a wide range of alternatives to the courts for different categories of of-
fenses.5 5 A judge, in a usual case, might choose a sentence which does not
involve confinement, such as probation, 56 a sentence involving partial con-
finement, 57 or total confinement at a usual incarceration facility58 or at
a special treatment facility (including youth correction facilities).5 9 Fines
would be imposed in felony cases only where the defendant had obtained
money or property as a result of his crime. 60
Sentences to imprisonment would be indeterminate in the sense that the
court would set a maximum term within the limit set by the legislature
and a minimum term at which the defendant would be eligible for parole.61
The sentences for most offenses would not exceed the five year range.62
53. Cf. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 401-02 (1958).
54. ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMAL STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
§ 1.1 (Tent. Draft, 1967) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. SENTENCING COMM.].
55. Id. § 2.2.
56. Id. § 2.3; cf. FED. R. CIM. P. 32 (a); 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). See A. PYE, G. SHADOAN
& J. SNEE, A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL PROBATION SYSTEM (1962).
57. A.B.A. SENTENCING COMM., supra note 54, at § 2.4; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (a) (1964).
58. Id. § 2.5.
59. Id. § 2.6; cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005 to 5026 (1964).
60. Id. § 2.7.
61. Id. §§ 3.1, 3.2[b]-[c]; cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4208, 4202 (1964).
62. Id.. § 2.1.
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The Committee recommends that a ceiling be placed on consecutive sen-
tences,63 that methods should be developed to integrate sentences imposed
by different jurisdictions on the same defendant,64 and that multiple offenses
be consolidated for sentencing at one time.65
A presentence report is recommended in every felony case and in all
cases involving first or youthful offenders.66 In addition, the court should
have access to additional resources where detailed information about the
defendant's mental or physical condition is necessary for the determination
of a proper sentence.67
One of the most recent changes which has occurred in the administration
of criminal justice is a new understanding of the role of defense counsel at
sentencing. Most persons who are charged with crime are convicted, and
many of the convictions result from pleas of guilty. Sentencing is therefore
the crucial phase of the criminal process for most defendants. Too often in
the past a lawyer has viewed his function at sentencing as limited to a plea
for leniency. Today more counsel are appreciating that the plea of leniency
is only as good as the factual basis upon which it rests. In appropriate
cases, the defense counsel must conduct an independent investigation uti-
lizing available community resources and produce a specific probation
program as a reasonable alternative to imprisonment if he is to be effective.
Few lawyers have training or experience in the performance of such tasks,
but competent representation at sentencing requires the acquisition of new
areas of expertise, and lawyers are proving equal to the challenge.68
Judges need appropriate standards as well as factual information in order
to sentence intelligently. Few lawyers have the knowledge or experience
necessary when they are appointed to trial benches for the difficult task of
sentencing. During recent years we have accepted the idea that there is
nothing degrading about judges studying in order to perform their jobs
more effectively. 69 The National College of State Trial Judges is now able
63. Id. § 3.4.
64. Id. § 3.5.
65. Id. § 5.2.
66. Id. § 4.1; cf. FED. R. CalM. P. 32 (c). Presentence reports are prepared in over 80
percent of federal cases; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REV. 135 (1965).
The A.B.A. SENTENCING COMM., supra note 54, at §§ 4.3, 4.4, also recommends that the
presentence report be made available to the defendant or his attorney, an important step
forward. See also Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81
HARV. L. REV. 821, 835-41 (1968).
67. Id. § 4.6; 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (b) (1964).
68. Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 286, 295-96 (1966);
A.B.A. SENTENCING COMM., supra note 54, at § 5.3.
69. See Smith, Upgrading and In-Service Training for the Judiciary, 34 INS. COUNSEL
J. 598 (1967); O'Connell, Continuing Legal Education for the Judiciary, 16 J. LEGAL ED.
405 (1964); Karlen, Judicial Education, 52 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1966); cf. Leflar, The Appellate
Judges Seminars, 21 ARK. L. REv. 190 (1967).
[V/ol. XVII
Criminal Justice 1968: Developments and Directions
to offer summer courses in which judges can compare experiences and
discuss the relative weight which should be accorded different factors in
sentencing, as well as engaging in other studies.70 In the federal system,
there have been a number of seminars and institutes in which judges have
discussed sentence disparity and the appropriate use of various sentencing
alternatives. 71
These discussions and other studies have raised substantial questions
concerning the undue weight given by some judges to the defendant's
willingness to plead guilty. In many jurisdictions defendants who insist on
exercising their constitutional rights to trial by jury are granted probation
less frequently and receive longer terms of imprisonment than defendants
who plead guilty.72 In some cases the leniency towards guilty pleaders (or
the severity towards those who demand trial by jury) seems to be motivated
by a belief on the part of the sentencing judge that showing repentance,
avoiding perjury, refusing to assert frivolous defenses, and generally co-
operating with the system is deserving of special consideration. 7 Some
judges go so far as to express the opinion that probation should not be
granted to a defendant who has pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury
trial.74 These practices have been criticized as discriminatory whenever an
innocent defendant is induced to plead guilty, or a guilty defendant is
punished more severely than another defendant with the identical back-
ground who has committed the same crime, although each may have an
equal need for the rehabilitative programs associated with "lenient" sen.
tencing.7 5 On a previous occasion, this author has noted that there is no
relation between a defendant's insistence on a jury trial and the question
whether he is a fit subject for probation.76 The theory behind probation
70. See Rosenberg, Judging Goes to College, 52 A.B.A.J. 342 (1966); Raskin, National
College of Trial Judges, 27 MILWAUKEE BAR ASS'N GAVEL 9 (1967).
71. See, e.g., Papers Delivered at the Institute on Sentencing for United States Judges of
the Eighth and Tenth Judicial Circuits (1966), 42 F.R.D. 175 (1967); Sentencing
Institute of Ninth Circuit, 39 F.R.D. 523 (1966); Sentencing Institute for the Second
Circuit, 41 F.R.D. 467 (1966); Papers Delivered at the Institutes on Sentencing for
United States District Judges, 37 F.R.D. 111 (1964).
72. See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 61 (1966); ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CRIMINAL TRIAL, A.B.A. PROJECr ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 37-38 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM.]. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME
IN THE DIsTRIcr OF COLUMBIA 385-86 (1966).
73. Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence,
66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
74. See, e.g., Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences for Sixth, Seventh and
Eighth Judicial Circuits, 30 F.R.D. 401, 449 (1961); REMINGTON & NEWMAN, THE HIGHLAND
PARE INSTITUTE ON SENTENCE DISPARITY FEDERAL PROBATION 6 (1962).
75. See Note, supra note 73.
76. Pye, Reflections on Proposals for Reform in Federal Criminal Procedure, 52 GEO.
L.J. 675, 701 (1964).
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is not leniency per se, but rather that some individual offenders should and
can be rehabilitated without incarceration.7 7
However, the Advisory Committee on the Criminal Tria 78 has assumed
that "conviction without trial will and should continue to be a most fre-
quent means for the disposition of criminal cases."79 In its opinion, the
existing plea bargaining system which produces a high percentage of guilty
pleas "cannot operate effectively unless trial judges in fact grant charge
and sentence concessions to most defendants who enter a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere."80 For this reason, the Committee has concluded that it
is proper for a court to grant concessions when the public interest in the
effective administration of criminal justice would thereby be served, but
that a court should not impose upon a defendant "any sentence in excess
of that which would be justified by any of the rehabilitative, protective,
deterrent or other purposes of the criminal law because the defendant has
chosen to require the prosecution to prove his guilt at trial rather than
to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."8's
The Committee is clearly correct in concluding that mere disparity in
sentencing existing between the defendant who stands trial and other defend-
ants does not mean that the former has received excessive punishment.82 In a
specific case, however, it may prove difficult to determine whether a de-
fendant has received an excessive sentence or has merely been denied the
leniency which he would have been accorded had he pleaded guilty.8 3 The
Committee has performed a service in ventilating an important issue too
long relegated to the "low visibility" area of the criminal process, but the
wisdom of its conclusion is arguable.
The question of granting leniency to defendants who plead guilty has
an additional dimension. Is it professionally proper for counsel to advise
a client to plead guilty when he maintains his innocence in the face of
overwhelming evidence of guilt? May a court properly accept a plea of
guilty under such circumstances? Most modem authorities would agree that
there must be a "factual basis" for a guilty plea.8 4 This, however, does not
answer the questions. There may be a strong "factual basis" for believing
77. Ibid.
78. Supra note 72.
79. CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM., supra note 72, at 2.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id. § 1.8.
82. Id. at 51.
83. Cf. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). See the articulate criti-
cism of "differential leniency" in Weinberg & Babcock, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 568, 618-
22 (1967).
84. See CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM., supra note 72, at § 1.6; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Note, Trial
Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 306.
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that a defendant is guilty, but he nevertheless may assert his innocence,
even though his conviction may be predicted with certitude and a more
severe sentence is likely if a plea of guilty is impermissible. The Committee
provides an opportunity to avoid the issue in some cases with its observa-
tion that a judge "otherwise satisfied that there is a factual basis for the
plea . .. is not required . .. [to] call upon the defendant to make an
unequivocal confession of guilt."85 The Committee is of the opinion,
however, that "if the defendant is called upon to make a statement and
he denies commission of the offense, then, notwithstanding the existence of
other information tending to verify the accuracy of the plea, it would be
inappropriate for the judge to enter judgment on the plea."8 6 Such a
position, while probably stating the traditional attitude of most courts, may
present counsel with substantial problems of professional responsibility,
such as the propriety of lecturing the client before ascertaining his guilt,
and, if the client answers the judge's questions untruthfully, the conflict
which may arise between counsel's duty of confidence to the client and
his duty of candor towards the court.8 7
One court of appeals has recognized the problem and, in dicta, indicated
that a defendant should not be required to publicly confess his guilt.8 8 It
is enough that the defendant voluntarily chooses to enter the plea with
an understanding of its significance, if the court is satisfied from other
information before it that there is a factual basis for the plea. Mr. Wein-
berg and Miss Babcock have suggested that the court should not be re-
quired to inquire whether the defendant was pleading guilty "because he
was guilty and for no other reason." 89 Instead, the court would simply
concern itself with why the defendant wishes to enter the plea. The de-
fendant would answer to the effect that he was doing what he thought was
best in view of his lawyer's advice. The lawyer would then explain to the
court why he advised this course of action and the court would determine
whether the plea should be accepted.90 A prompt resolution of the issue
is obviously of great importance in a system which depends on guilty
pleas for its effective operation.
Sentencing disparity continues to constitute a fundamental problem for
85. CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM., supra note 72, at 33. The issue might also be avoided by
pleading nolo contendere. Cf. CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM., id. § 1.1 (b).
86. CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM., supra note 72, at 34.
87. Cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953); McKissick v.
United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967). Symposium, Profession Ethics, 64 MICH.
L. REy. 1469 (1966).
88. McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
89. See, Resolution of the Judges of the District of Columbia (1959), in Everett v. United
States, 336 F.2d 979, 980 (D.C. Cit. 1964).
90. See Weinberg & Babcock, supra note 83, at 620-21.
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the system.91 To some extent, the exchange of views among trial judges
and the use of indeterminate sentences alleviates the problem. Neverthe-
less, most jurisdictions regularly produce cases of unusually harsh sentences
meted out to certain defendants, such as the action of a Baltimore judge
who sentenced a defendant to the maximum term of twenty years for a
$47 robbery, much to the shock of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which lacked power to correct the abuse.92 Considerable attention is now
being devoted to the desirability of review of sentences by appellate courts.9 3
The Senate has passed a bill which would permit the appellate review of
sentences in the federal system.94
Even if appellate review of sentencing does not obtain general acceptance,
it is likely that appellate courts will continue to limit sentencing preroga-
tives of trial courts, a practice unknown in the past. One federal court
of appeals has reversed a case in which the request by a recidivist for a
mental examination before imposition of sentence was denied and the
maximum punishment was summarily imposed.95 Other federal courts
91. Devitt, How Can We Effectively Minimize Unjustified Disparity in Federal Criminal
Sentences? 42 F.R.D. 218 (1967); Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences for the
Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Judicial Circuits, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1962).
92. Stevens v. Warden, 382 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1967).
93. See Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review?
41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955); Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1966);
Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964); Symposium, Appel-
late Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 257 (1963). See also Hearings on S. 2722 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The Advisory Committee on Sentencing and
Review, A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, has recom-
mended appellate review of sentences in every case in which review of a trial leading to
conviction would be available. A.B.A. SENTENCING COMM., supra note 54, at § 1.I.
The Advisory Committee recommended that appellate courts be authorized to reduce
excessive sentences. Id. §§ 3.2, 3.3, 3.4. The Special Committee on Minimum Standards
for the Administration of Justice, in December 1967, recommended that appellate courts
be empowered to increase the sentence on appeal by the defendant. It is to be hoped that
the Special Committee's recommendation will be rejected. The existence of such a
power would constitute a patent deterrent to appeals, and could have the effect of
increasing resort to post-conviction collateral attacks. It is extraordinary that such a
proposal could be made so shortly after the English have decided to deny such power
to their appellate courts after sixty years of experience with a statute that permitted an
increase. REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL,
MEADOR REPORT, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES 62-63.
94. S. 1540, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); 1967-68 CCH CONG. INDEX 3558.
95. Leach v. United States, 320 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), sentence reconsidered and rein-
stated, 218 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1963). Here defendant appealed the decision of the
district court, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
reinstatement of the sentence and remanded on the ground that refusal to order a pre-
sentence mental examination was an abuse of discretion where the prisoner was an
extreme recidivist. Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964); noted, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 754 (1965).
On remand, the examination was ordered, after which the original sentence was im-
posed. United States v. Leach, 231 F. Supp. 544 (D.D.C. 1964), afj'd, 353 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917 (1966).
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have required trial judges passing sentence to take into account the time
a defendant was deprived of his liberty while awaiting trial.96
In some jurisdictions, a defendant who receives a sentence of less than
the maximum is required to play Russian roulette if he wishes to appeal.
If he obtains a reversal on appeal but is convicted again on retrial, he
may be sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment than he received orig-
inally, or denied credit for time served under the first conviction. Thus,
in a recent North Carolina case, a defendant was sentenced to prison for
a term of twenty years. Subsequently, his conviction was set aside by a
federal court on the ground that he had been deprived of a constitutional
right.97 Upon retrial, he was again convicted. The trial judge purportedly
gave him credit for the five years served on the original sentence, and
then sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. The defendant was in
fact penalized five years for asserting his constitutional right. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina saw nothing wrong with such a procedure; in its
opinion, a defendant should be expected to accept the hazards as well as
the benefits of an appeal. 98 Such reasoning constitutes a thinly disguised
attempt to discourage appeals and collateral attacks on convictions by
holding a club over the head of a defendant who has been deprived of his
rights, but who has received less than a maximum sentence. 99 In Patton v.
United States, 00 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that such a procedure constitutes an unconstitutional condition to
the exercise of a defendant's right to a fair trial, denies a defendant the
equal protection of the law, and places him twice in jeopardy for the
same offense. There is a split in authority on the point,'0 ' and it is re-
grettable that the Supreme Court declined to review the Patton decision.' 02
96. See Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The Bail Reform Act of
1966 requires that credit be given for time served before trial because of inability to
obtain pre-trial release. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (Supp. II, 1966). Several courts have required
that credit be given to defendants convicted before the Bail Reform Act became effective.
See, e.g., Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dunn v. United States,
376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1967).
97. Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966). For commentary on
this case see Note, 1966 DuKE L.J. 1172; Note, 80 HARv. L. RaV. 891 (1967); Note, 20 VAND.
L. RaV. 660 (1967).
98. State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005
(1965); State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).
99. See Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the
Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rav. 239 (1951); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penal-
ties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965).
100. 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); see Note, 46 N.C.L. Rav. 407 (1968).
101. Cf. Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967) (increase permissible
when based on events occurring subsequent to first trial); United States ex rel.
Stainer v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967) (increase permissible).
102. The Court's denial of certiorari is reported in North Carolina v. Patton, 390 U.S.
905 (1968).
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It seems clear, however, that harsher penalties imposed under circumstances
such as those of the Patton case will be prohibited, although perhaps on
narrower grounds than those enunciated in the fourth circuit opinion.
Disposition of Defendants Who Are Not Convicted
Our system for the administration of criminal justice is becoming increas-
ingly interested in the disposition of defendants who enter the criminal
process, but who are not convicted. In most American jurisdictions, a prose-
cutor has wide discretionary powers, but the system has been slow to
develop standards governing the exercise of this discretion' 0 3 Now, the
Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions of the
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice is attempting to articulate definitive standards. 04
The Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit has endorsed
the learned report of a special committee which studied problems involving
the disposition of offenders who are incompetent to stand trial.10 5 Unfor-
tunately, no legislative action to implement the recommendation of the
report has been taken yet. The appropriate disposition of offenders found
not guilty by reason of insanity still poses a problem. In some jurisdictions,
the defendant is entitled to release, unless subject to civil commitment. In
other jurisdictions, there is provision for automatic committal, at least for
a period required to determine his present mental condition. 100
No attempt is now being made to aid acquitted defendants in readjust-
ing.' 07 Frequently, the defendant who has been acquitted will be plunged
back into an environment with which he is unable to cope. He may need
assistance in solving his problems to an extent equal to that of the con-
victed defendant who is on probation. Today we are beginning to appreciate
that the criminal process does not exist in a vacuum. We can reasonably
expect such social services to be developed during the coming years.
IV. Procedural Reform
The most significant reforms in our system for the administration of criminal
justice during recent years have occurred in the field of criminal procedure.
103. See D. NEWMAN, supra note 72; Polstein, How to Settle a Criminal Case, 8
PRc. LAW No. 1, 35 (1962); Nedrud, The Role of the Prosecutor in Criminal Procedure,
32 Kan. C.L. REv. 142 (1964); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors'
Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948).
104. Cf. CRIMINAL TRIAL COMM., supra note 72, at 60-71.
105. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES,
BEFORE TRIAL (1966); cf. The particular problem posed by the defendant who suffers
from amnesia. Wilson v. United States, No. 20887 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 18, 1968).
106. Bolton v. Harris, No. 21032 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1968).
107. See Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 286, 299 (1966).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has provided the principal leader-
ship, but innovations have also been instituted by the Congress, some of
the lower federal courts-notably the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit-some of the state appellate courts-
notably those of California and New York-and some of the state legislatures.
There have probably been more important changes in criminal procedure
during the last decade than in the total history of criminal procedure in
America before 1957.
From the opinions of the Supreme Court, two distinct trends emerge.
Frequently, they coalesce in specific cases.
The Trend Towards Equality
There is a clear movement toward equal protection through procedural safe-
guards. It has two facets. In the first place, the poor man under police
investigation or charged with crime is entitled to the same rights and privi-
leges as the wealthier citizen.' 08 While absolute equality is not required-
and indeed, probably cannot be obtained-"invidious discrimination" be-
tween the rich and the poor in the administration of criminal justice must
be avoided.10 9 This doctrine was forcefully articulated twelve years ago
in Griffin v. Illinois.1"0 In the last decade, the Griffin case has spawned an
impressive progeny of cases requiring states to permit an indigent, wherever
a more affluent defendant could appeal by merely paying established filing
fees, to appeal in forma pauperis,11' and to provide counsel at trial"12
and for at least one appeal 1 ' to an indigent charged with a felony. Al-
though not the controlling factor, the doctrine was persuasive in the recent
decisions providing procedural safeguards to indigents during police in-
terrogations."14 The entire approach of the Supreme Court towards the
administration of criminal justice has been marked by this quest for equal
treatment."15 Traditional practices are now subjected to a critical re-
appraisal dictated by the realization that most of the people who run afoul
of the criminal law are the poor, the uneducated, and members of minority
groups.
108. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
109. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
110. Supra note 108.
111. Ibid. Cf. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S.
192 (1966).
112. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
113. Douglas v. California, supra note 109; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
114. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
115. See Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind?-The Bazelon-
Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54
Ky. L.J. 464 (1966); correspondence between Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Hon. David
G. Bazelon, reprinted id. at 486 (Appendix A).
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The movement towards equality has yet another dimension. There is a
dear trend towards requiring state courts to provide defendants with the
same basic rights as the federal courts are obligated to provide by virtue
of the Bill of Rights. The Court has gone far towards insuring that the
same basic standard of procedural fairness is observed in state and federal
courts by decisions which require the appointment of counsel for indigents
in every felony case; 1 6 prohibit the admission of evidence obtained as a
result of an unlawful search and seizure; 1 7 guarantee the federal privilege
against self-incrimination to a witness in a state proceeding;118 deny
prosecutors the right to comment on the defendant's failure to testify"19
and obligate them to reveal evidence favorable to a defendant; 120 insure
the defendant's rights of confrontation, 121 compulsory process for wit-
nesses, 22 and the right to a speedy trial; 2 apply the same requirements
in interrogation 24 and lineups125 whether conducted by state or federal
police; and impose the same tests for the resolution of the issue of admis-
sibility of confessions at trial.126 The Court has not sought to make state
and federal criminal procedure the same, 27 but most of the basic rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights are now available to a defendant whether
he is tried in a state or federal court. 28
Perhaps the most significant changes in state criminal procedure have
been implemented by opinions broadening the scope of review when
prisoners seek to attack collaterally in federal courts their state court con-
victions upon the grounds of deprivation of constitutional rights. Yet the
Supreme Court has recognized that there may not be spontaneous com-
pliance with its new requirements and that it cannot possibly review all
such allegations of denial of rights. In the past, the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts upon inquiry through a writ of habeas corpus into
the circumstances surrounding a conviction by a state court was severely
limited. In 1963, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of review in
116. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 112.
117. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
118. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52 (1964).
119. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
120. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967);
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
121. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
122. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
123. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
124. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 114.
125. United States v. Wade, supra note 114; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
126. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967).
127. Cf. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
128. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALF.
L. REv. 929 (1965).
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Fay v. Noia"29 and Townsend v. Sain."30 Federal courts may now make an
independent evidentiary examination into alleged constitutional violations
in a state prosecution after trial and appellate proceedings are complete,
largely unfettered by state procedural rules.' 31 Whether the constitutional
issue was raised in the state courts is immaterial to federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction, although the federal judge in his discretion may decline to
review the defendant's contention of constitutional error if he finds that
the defendant either deliberately bypassed state procedures, or had a full
hearing on the point in the state court. These opinions have been accom-
panied by other cases in which the Supreme Court broadened the power
of federal courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings 132 and expanded the
scope of its own inquiry in direct reviews of state court convictions.
33
Principles of federalism have yielded to the necessity of protecting the
rights of the individual. These new powers in the federal courts give the
states the choice of guaranteeing the protection of the federal constitutional
rights of defendants in their own courts, or having their supreme courts rele-
gated to the status of intermediate courts in a federal hierarchy.
The Trend Towards Realistic Implementation of Rights
The second major trend in the Supreme Court is the movement towards
implementation of rights to which lip service has been paid for generations.
The last decade has witnessed an appreciation that rights guaranteed to
the people by a constitution or statutes are less important than the rights
which they are really able to exercise in practice. The right to counsel
was thus of little use to the majority of Americans charged with crime who
could not afford a lawyer, until the states began providing counsel for
indigents."34 The privilege against self-incrimination was of limited sig-
nificance if the police could obtain confessions by inherently coercive
interrogations of citizens who were either ignorant of their right to remain
silent or too weak to assert it."sr The defendant's right to remain silent at
trial was illusory if a prosecutor could comment to a jury on his failure
to testify, thereby encouraging the jury to infer guilt from his silence."36
129. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
130. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
131. Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction
Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964); Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State
Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286 (1966).
132. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
134. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 112. See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR
IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as L. SILVERSTEIN].
135. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 114.
136. Griffin v. California, supra note 119.
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Requirements of prompt presentation of arrested persons before magistrates
were reduced to platitudes if police were permitted to ignore the legislative
mandate and use the products of their law-breaking as evidence against a
defendant in a court of justice.137 The liberty of the individual and the
sanctity of his home lost much of their meaning if police could arrest or
search without probable cause and profit by their wrongdoing,138 or if
artificial rules concerning standing to object precluded judicial scrutiny of
police misconduct. 39
The idea that a search warrant should be obtained from an impartial
magistrate before a house is entered and searched is not novel,140 nor is
the notion that a search of a house without a warrant in the absence of
exigent circumstances is unconstitutional. What is new is that the consti-
tutional mandate must be observed if the police wish to use the evidence
uncovered by the search. 141 This idea may even be novel to states which
already had exclusionary rules before the Supreme Court decision. Profes-
sor Michael Katz's recent study of practice in North Carolina indicates
that 18 percent of the trial judges, 34 percent of the prosecutors, and 29
percent of the defense counsel surveyed were unaware that a North Caro-
lina statute precluded the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an
unlawful search and seizure before the Mapp decision.142
The idea that a defendant has a privilege to remain silent and the right
to counsel when subjected to police interrogation does not shock many
Americans. Americans have always had the right to assistance of counsel
in a criminal trial. The difference is that now indigent citizens actually
have lawyers.' 4' However, the notion that the police should inform a de-
fendant of these rights and refrain from interrogating him if he chooses
to exercise them causes consternation to many. 44
The great accomplishment of the last decade is the removal of many of
the elements of hypocrisy from criminal procedure. Rights given to individu-
als are now being implemented and enforced. Experience may indicate
that the requirements of law enforcement are inconsistent with some of
these rights. If this proves to be the case, society may determine to limit
137. Mallory v. United States, supra note 127.
138. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 117.
139. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
140. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
141. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 117; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
142. Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North
Carolina. The Model, the Study and the Implications, 45 N.C.L. REv. 119 (1966).
143. See L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 134, passim; Silverstein, The Continuing Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright on the States, 51 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1965).
144. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 114.
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the rights of its citizens.145 Such an approach is far sounder than paying
lip service to sham rights which do not exist in practice.
Expansion of Police Powers
It would be inaccurate to leave the impression that the Court has been
concerned exclusively with the rights of the individual. In a number of
opinions, the Court has reaffirmed or expanded the powers of law enforce-
ment officers to investigate crime. Too often, these opinions are ignored
in a catalog of the Court's accomplishments.
Today, there is no good reason why an officer with probable cause to
arrest or search cannot accomplish his objective lawfully if he takes the
time to apply for a warrant in the manner set forth by the Court's opin-
ions. The Court has been most reluctant to set aside arrests or searches
where officers first obtained warrants after revealing the facts underlying
their conclusion of probable cause to an impartial magistrate. 146 It has
permitted police determination of probable cause even where largely based
on information provided by informants, 47 and generally allowed police to
conceal the informant's identity from a curious defendant before trial.14 8
It has upheld arrests without warrants or searches where probable cause
existed to believe that the suspect had committed an offense, even though
the police had adequate time to obtain a warrant and chose not to avail
themselves of the opportunity. 149 The Court has permitted searches of
vehicles without a warrant when there was probable cause to believe that
they were carrying contraband,15 0 entries into houses without advance
warning of the officer's identity or purpose where there were "exigent cir-
cumstances,"' 51 and a search of a dwelling without a warrant in "hot
pursuit" of the defendant or weapons. 152 Recently, the Court has placed
its imprimatur upon searches, the object of which is to locate nontestimonial
evidentiary material, despite a long federal history which limited lawful
searches to contraband, and the fruits or instrumentalities of crime.
5 3
145. Symposium, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v.
Arizona, 35 FoRDHAM L. REv. 169 (1966); Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-
Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 32, 37 n.8 (1965).
146. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
147. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. United States,
supra note 139; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
148. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
149. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Ker v. California, supra note 141.
150. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949).
151. Ker v. California, supra note 141; cf. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
152. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
153. Ibid.
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It has also rejected contentions that police officers should not be permitted
to use informers and undercover agents. 15 4 Although the Court set aside
a conviction involving the identification of a defendant at a lineup con-
ducted in the absence of defense counsel, it made it clear that legislation
eliminating the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestions at lineup pro-
ceedings may also remove the basis for requiring the presence of counsel. 155
It declared a New York electronic surveillance statute unconstitutional,
but suggested that a more restricted statute might be constitutional. 5 6 The
Court has allowed spontaneous confessions and statements by a defendant
resulting from police interrogation if the government is able to establish
that the defendant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent after being
warned of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. 57
It has specifically refrained from imposing upon the states the strict federal
rules excluding evidence obtained during a period of unnecessary delay
between arrest and presentment before a committing magistrate.5 8
In balance, it must be conceded that police powers have been reduced as
a result of the Court decisions during the last decade. It is certainly unjusti-
fied, however, to conclude that the police have been handcuffed.
The Court has permitted the police to engage in tactics needed in solving
most crimes. There may be some "solitary killers where the only witnesses
to their crimes are dead"'5 9 who may escape punishment by asserting
their constitutional rights. These are the cases which cause the most public
furor, because, as the National Crime Commission has pointed out, "the
public fears most the crimes that occur least often, crimes of violence."' 160
However, many of these offenses are the easiest to solve because most
murders, rapes, and aggravated assaults are apparently committed by per-
sons known to the victim-by relatives, friends, or acquaintances.161 The
District of Columbia Crime Commission study revealed that almost two-
thirds of rape victims surveyed were attacked by persons with whom they
were at least casually acquainted. 62 Eighty-one percent of assault victims
154. Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
155. United States v. Wade, supra note 114.
156. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 296
(1968).
157. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 114.
158. Mallory v. United States, supra note 127; Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 114.
159. Broderick, The Supreme Court and the Police: A Police Viewpoint, 57 J. CRiM.
L.C. & P.S. 271 (1966).
160. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 51 (1967).
161. Id. at 39-40.
162. Id. at 40.
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were acquainted with their assailant. 16 In Philadelphia only 12.2 percent
of murders were committed by strangers. 64 Other studies have revealed
that a very high percentage of crimes of violence are committed against
victims of the same race as the offender.1 5 The interracial rape or murder
is the exception rather than the rule.
Most cases can be solved by competent law enforcement agencies within
the guidelines established by the Court's decisions. Furthermore, it does
not follow that broadened police powers will significantly affect the number
of cases prosecuted or the number of defendants convicted. In the routine
cases constituting the bulk of the criminal docket, many other more sig-
nificant factors, such as the availability of prosecutors and judges and
standards of prosecutorial discretion, may intervene between the close of a
police investigation and final disposition. 166 Too often, people jump to
the conclusion that broadened police powers will necessarily result in sub-
stantially more convictions, or that more convictions will substantially
reduce the crime rate.
Congressional Reforms
The Supreme Court has not been responsible for all criminal procedure
reforms; the Congress deserves credit for several important innovations.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964167 provided for the first time compensa-
tion for attorneys appointed to represent indigents in federal criminal
cases, along with auxiliary services such as reimbursement for out-of-pocket
costs incurred during investigations, funds to permit the hiring of in-
vestigators in special cases, and fees for expert witnesses. 168
Bail Reform
Perhaps the outstanding contribution of the Congress has been in the re-
form of the bail system. The right to bail is insignificant to a defendant
unable to pay a bond premium. For some time, it has been known that
even small bonds are beyond the financial capacity of many defendants. 169
Only more recently, has it been learned that many defendants charged
163. Ibid.
164. Id. at 39.
165. Id. at 40.
166. Pye, The Supreme Court and the Police: Fact and Fiction, 57 J. CRam. L.C. &
P.S. 404, 413 (1966).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3006 (a) (1964). See Kutak, The Criminal justice Act of 1964, 44 NEB. L.
REV. 703 (1965).
168. Ibid.
169. L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 134, at 7-8; D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED
STATES 9-22 (1964); Comment, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail
in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954); Comment, A Study of the Administration
of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693 (1958).
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with crime may be released on their personal recognizance, without any
appreciable danger that they will abscond before trial.170
The use of personal recognizance or other nonfinancial conditions can
assure pre-trial liberty to a substantial number of defendants who in the
past have been imprisoned before trial solely because of their inability to
pay a bond premium. 17 ' It also reduces the cost to the municipality which
otherwise would have to pay the direct costs of detention, and frequently
the indirect costs of public welfare assistance to the defendant's family.'
7 2
Furthermore, it restores rationality to the system.
In 1966, the Congress passed the Bail Reform Act. 73 The Act provides
that any person charged with a noncapital offense in a federal court shall
be released on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an
unsecured appearance bond, unless the committing magistrate determines
that release under such conditions will not reasonably assure the appearance
of a defendant at trial.' 7 4 If the judge finds that something more is re-
quired to assure the defendant's presence at trial, he is authorized to
release the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him, place restrictions on his travel, associations or
place of abode, or require him to deposit not more than ten percent of the
amount of an appearance bond as security with the provision that the
amount will be returned to the defendant if he appears on the appointed
day.' 75 The judge is further authorized to require the execution of a
bail bond with sureties only if one of these conditions or a combination
of them is deemed to provide inadequate assurance of the defendant's
presence at trial. 76 If the defendant cannot obtain his release after twenty-
four hours, he is entitled to have the conditions reviewed by the judge
who imposed them. 77 The judge is required to state in writing the reasons
for the condition imposed if he does not amend the conditions to enable
the defendant to obtain his release. 78
170. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the
Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67 (1963); McCarthy & Wahl, The District
of Columbia Bail Project: An Illustration of Experimentation and a Brief for
Change, 53 GEo. L.J. 675 (1965); R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL:
FINAL REPORT OF THE D.C. BAIL PROJECT (1966). Cf. R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM (1965);
REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963).
171. R. MOLLEUR, supra note 170, at 31.
172. Id. at 87-96.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Supp. II, 1966). See Wald & Freed, The Bail Reform Act of
1966: A Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940 (1966); Ervin, The Legislative Role in Bail
Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1967).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (Supp. II, 1966).
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(d) (Supp. II, 1966).
178. Ibid.
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The statute obviously proceeds upon the assumption that the benefit
of the doubt should be given to pre-trial release. Its administration has dis-
closed an important problem which in the past had been somewhat obscured.
American law has never permitted the denial of bail because the accused
is thought to be dangerous. 7 9 In fact, however, trial judges have been
able to "preventively detain" a supposed dangerous offender simply by
fixing a bond beyond his capacity to meet. Now, for the first time the sys-
tem is required to determine forthrightly whether society should be able
to deny a defendant his liberty before trial, not because he may flee the
jurisdiction, but because he may commit "another offense." Greater knowl-
edge of the effect of prior practices has resulted in considerable concern,
and the operation of the Act is now being studied. 8 0 One senator has
gone so far as to introduce legislation to permit preventive detention of
dangerous defendants.' 8 '
The Bail Reform Act has also demonstrated that judges need assistance in
determining the conditions, if any, to be imposed upon a defendant seeking
pre-trial liberty. The problem is akin to that faced by a judge in sentencing.
Congress has established a bail agency in the District of Columbia 182 to
accomplish this function. In other areas, private organizations modeled
after the highly successful Vera Foundation Manhattan Bail Project in
New York City are providing similar assistance. Unfortunately, similar serv-
ices are not available to most judges.
The federal reform has provided the impetus to projects across the coun-
try. Legislation designed to reform the bail system has been passed or
introduced in a number of states, and experimental projects are operating
in many municipalities.1s 3
Improved Training and Personnel
The crying need of the criminal justice system is for more and better per-
sonnel and techniques. This costs money. While the administration of
criminal justice is a matter of national concern, the responsibility for law
enforcement is primarily a matter of local or state concern. Frequently,
179. Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 813 (1964); Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, Tit. II, § 103, 64
Stat. 1021.
180. A committee has been appointed by the Judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit to study the matter. In addition studies have been conducted by the
Office of Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice. See also United States v. Penn,
No. 1434-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., Jan. 30, 1968).
181. S. 484, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
182. 80 Stat. 327 (1966).
183. See Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts-A Field Study and Report, 50 MINN.
L. Rav. 621 (1966); Note, Bail Reform in the State and Federal Systems, 20 VAND. L.
REv. 948 (1967).
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however, state and local governments do not have or will not allocate funds
necessary to train their law enforcement officers or to modernize their law
enforcement techniques.
To encourage state and local governments to meet these needs, Congress
enacted the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965.184 This measure
authorizes the Attorney General to grant funds and contract for the estab-
lishment, improvement, or enlargement of programs and facilities for the
training of state and local law enforcement, correctional and crime preven-
tion personnel, and to contract with private or public nonprofit organiza-
tions for the support of projects designed to improve techniques, practices,
and capabilities of state and local agencies engaged in law enforcement,
criminal law administration, correction of offenders, or prevention and
control of crime. Over 250 grants have been made. The Act has proved to
be an excellent example of "creative federalism," although the funds avail-
able have been limited.
In 1967, a new bill was introduced. Originally called the "Law Enforce-
ment and Criminal Justice Assistance Act," it has been renamed the "Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act" during its travels through the Congress. The
bill was designed to broaden the extent of federal support to state and
local programs designed to improve the administration of justice.
In the House, the bill was amended to authorize grants for the establish-
ment and operation of state planning agencies to be responsible for de-
veloping comprehensive statewide plans. 8 5 Federal funds would be
distributed in block grants to the states rather than on the basis of need
and willingness and capacity to innovate. In effect, the state organization
would be an intermediary which would screen applications and distribute
funds to local communities.
There can be little objection in theory to state planning. In practice,
however, it assumes a law enforcement structure within each state which
simply does not exist in many jurisdictions. All the states, except Hawaii,
have some form of state law enforcement body.18 6 Some have general polic-
ing authority, but many are restricted to the functions of enforcing traffic
laws and protecting life and property on the highways. They may pro-
vide logistic services such as criminal identification systems, police training
programs, or state communications systems, but few have the authority or
expertise to assume the coordinating role that the amended bill would
184. Pub. L. No. 89-197, Sept. 22, 1965, 79 Stat. 828, as amended by Pub. L. No.
89-798, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1506.
185. H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see H.R. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
186. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JuSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 119-23 (1967).
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impose on them. There is little doubt that the limited federal money
available can best be spent by direct grants to innovative communities and
institutions, rather than by paying the costs of establishing and operating
state planning agencies. The House version of the bill could in fact become
a patronage distribution act as local communities apply pressure for a slice
of the federal pie. The bill passed the House on August 8, 1967.
The fate of the bill in the House was pleasant compared to its reception
in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee reported out
a bill, Title II of which contains a number of unfortunate amendments.18 7
One would deny lower federal court jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks
on state court criminal judgments, even where defendants' constitutional
rights have been abridged, thereby overruling Townsend v. Sain and Fay v.
Noia. Another would deprive both the lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court of power to review the voluntariness of a confession admitted in a state
criminal trial where the highest court of the state has found the confession
voluntary, regardless of whether the state court flagrantly defied the Supreme
Court's prior determinations requiring application of appropriate standards
under the fourteenth, sixth and fifth amendments. Another provision would
permit the introduction of a confession in a federal trial if the court
determined that the confession was voluntary, even if authorities obtained
the confession during custodial interrogation without informing defendant of
his privilege against self-incrimination or of his right to assistance of counsel,
required by the Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment in Miranda
v. Arizona.
The bill would also overturn the McNabb-Mallory s8 doctrine, which for
twenty years has excluded in federal courts admission of confessions obtained
during a period of unnecessary delay between arrest and presentment before
a magistrate. Another amendment, apparently designed to overrule the
Supreme Court's decisions in the Wade and Gilbert'8 9 cases, would not only
permit the introduction of "eye witness" testimony where a defendant has
been denied assistance of counsel at a lineup in violation of the sixth amend-
ment, but would also permit admission of testimony itself constituting a
denial of due process of law, as in the case of testimony resulting from an un-
fairly staged lineup.
At this late date in constitutional history it should be clear that the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. The Court has
interpreted the fifth amendment in Miranda and the sixth amendment in
Wade. It is neither the function of the Congress nor within its power to
187. S. 917, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
188. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 784 (1943);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
189. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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overrule these decisions. Equally clear, Congress cannot require a federal
court to permit a conviction resting upon evidence obtained in violation of
the Constitution.
It is doubtful that Congress has the authority to deny the Supreme Court
the right to review a state court ruling admitting a confession obtained in
violation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments, after a state supreme court
has opined that the confession is voluntary. Although the power to limit
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court finds support in Ex Parte Mc-
Cardle,190 it is doubtful whether that case would be decided the same way
today. Even if it continues to have validity, it may be distinguished. The bill
in question poses grave problems of equal protection which the Court in Mc-
Cardle did not face since it would deprive a single class of defendants, those
whose confessions have been found voluntary by the highest state courts, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court to review lower court rulings affecting
their constitutional rights. It is extremely questionable whether this class
of defendants is sufficiently distinctive to merit subjecting its members to
this type of overt discrimination. Such an attempt to divest the Court of
appellate jurisdiction in an area where Congress disagrees with its decisions
poses a grave threat to the balance of powers.
The proposed denial of jurisdiction to lower federal courts in cases where
state criminal judgments are attacked on constitutional grounds is defended
upon the ground of congressional power to limit lower federal court juris-
diction. Its practical effect would be to suspend for state prisoners the federal
writ of habeas corpus, the "Great Writ" which has protected the liberty of
English-speaking persons for almost three hundred years. In addition, sub-
stantial problems of equal protection are implicit where the meaning of the
Constitution depends on local option, unless Supreme Court review can be
obtained. Even if such a drastic step is constitutional, it is clearly unwise.
Large numbers of cases are now brought to federal courts by state prisoners
because of the refusal or failure of some state courts to follow Supreme Court
decisions, and the failure of most states to enact modern post-conviction
remedies. The Supreme Court is not able to review all cases in which there
are substantial allegations of deprivation of constitutional rights. To permit
the continued confinement of state prisoners, whose convictions rest upon
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, or whose sentences violate
constitutional mandates, would make the Bill of Rights meaningless to a
substantial number of citizens accused of crime, and reduce the supremacy
clause to a meaningless rubric in the field of criminal procedure. It would
also remove one of the principal incentives to the reform of state criminal
procedure.
190. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
[Vol. XVII
Criminal Justice 1968: Developments and Directions
Overturning the McNabb-Mallory rule is also unwise. It has proved to be
an effective device for discouraging arrests without probable cause and im-
plementing the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and
the right to bail. Furthermore, there is no evidence that it has constituted
any impediment to federal law enforcement. Congressional legislation last
year overturned the Mallory rule in the District of Columbia, but incorporated
the constitutionally required Miranda safeguards conspicuously absent from
the present bill. The present effort to overturn Mallory can only be described
as an attempt designed to reverse the trend of the Court's recent criminal
procedural reforms which have strengthened the rights of the individual with-
out comparable benefits to law enforcement. The manner in which the bill
seeks to achieve these objectives again raises doubt concerning its constitution-
ality. Although not permitting delay in order to interrogate, the bill does
require the court to sustain admission of evidence obtained during a period
of unlawful delay. Such an approach is inconsistent with the imperative of
judicial independence and the integrity of the processes of justice implicit
in Article III of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the Senate approved many
of the amendments on May 21, 1968.
The President has recently renewed his request for legislation and urged
that $100 million be appropriated. It is hoped that Congress will respond
without any politically inspired pork barrel amendments or attempts to
limit federal court power to require state observance of the Constitution.
Hopefully, Congress will grant broad authority to the Attorney General to
provide grants for projects dealing with the correctional system and court
administration, as well as law enforcement activities.
Two other federal measures deserve attention. Congress has established
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.19x Pro-
fessor Louis B. Schwartz is directing an ambitious project that should not
only remove much of the present confusion and inconsistency in federal
law, but provide a model for state code revisions as well. Congress is also
considering a major reform of the United States Commission System. A
bill which would replace United States Commissioners with a system of
federal magistrates has been passed by the Senate and is now pending in
the House. 92
V. The Future
The changes of the last decade have unalterably changed the course of
American criminal procedure. Reasonable men may differ as to whether
191. Pub. L. No. 89-801, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1516.
192. S. 945, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); 1 CRIM. L. Rpm. 2184 (1967).
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all of the changes were reforms, but no student of the process can fail to
see the general directions in which our criminal procedure will continue to
evolve.
The pace of change may be less swift in the future. Many of the big
issues involving interrogation and search and seizure have been decided.
During this term, the Court will deal with the important issue of the
power of a police officer to stop, frisk, and interrogate a suspect when he
has no probable cause to believe that any offense has been committed by
the person detained.193 In the future, it must provide additional guidance
concerning what constitutes a "custodial interrogation," a "waiver," or
"the fruit of the poisonous tree" within the context of the interrogation
procedures laid down in Miranda.194 It has yet to decide whether the right
to bail is a federal constitutional right. The constitutional requirements
for permissible electronic surveillance need to be elaborated.19 Undoubt-
edly, other important issues will also require resolution.
To a large extent, however, the coming years will be an era of imple-
mentation and enforcement of the doctrines enunciated during the last
decade, rather than a period of new fundamental change. The Supreme
Court has provided the outlines of the criminal procedure which it thinks
should be followed in a civilized society. It is up to the states to translate
these principles into reality and to accommodate their procedures to the
Supreme Court model. They have been presented a great challenge. It
remains to be seen whether they will be equal to it.
Some may choose to sit back and criticize Supreme Court justices as
"judicial activists," or complain that too much attention has been given to
the rights of criminals and not enough to the rights of the public, or com-
plain about "sociological jurisprudence." Others may exhaust their energies
in futile attempts to deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review
certain types of criminal cases or to amend the Constitution to provide
that every person is presumed to know his rights, and to permit prosecutors
to comment on the defendant's exercise of his rights. Others may simply
do nothing, adopting the view that they will take no action until the
Supreme Court requires it, regardless of the clear thrusts of the opinions.
Some would like to take constructive action, but the shortage of human and
material resources have produced a frustration which expresses itself in
193. Sibron v. New York, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966),
prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967); Peters v. New York, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d
595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966), prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 980 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 5
Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966), cert. granted, 387 U.S. 929 (1967); Wain-
wright v. New Orleans, 248 La. 1097, 184 So. 2d 23 (1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
194. See Pye, Symposium, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 35 FoRDHAM L. REv. 169, 199 (1966).
195. See Katz v. United States, supra note 156.
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inaction. Such attitudes border on nihilism. The immediate result of a
failure to implement Supreme Court decisions is the prompt reversal of
state judgments.196
Even more significant than reversal of individual cases may be the erosion
of the principles of federalism which will result from a consistent failure
by state courts to enforce constitutional mandates. Reexamination of the
state supreme courts' judgments by the lowest federal courts will become
the rule instead of the exception. Fortunately, these factors seem to be
understood; state legislators and judges, with some notable exceptions, are
undertaking the task of reexamining state procedures in the light of the
recent decisions. The task is formidable.
All states now provide counsel for the indigent in felony trials. However,
a substantial number do not provide counsel in preliminary examinations,
misdemeanor trials, or post-conviction proceedings. Although the authorities
are now split,197 there is little doubt that the Supreme Court will require
counsel in all criminal proceedings punishable by any substantial loss of
liberty when an appropriate case reaches it. 198 It is difficult to imagine
the Court endorsing a doctrine which determines the existence of a right
to counsel on the basis of whether the state chooses to label a particular
offense as a misdemeanor or a felony.' 99 States which do not provide coun-
sel in misdemeanor cases are operating on borrowed time.
To encourage police officers to seek warrants, the Supreme Court has
liberally approached arrests and searches authorized by warrants. 200 This
favoritism shown to warrants rests upon two assumptions. In the first
place, it is assumed that the warrant application or the affidavit in support
thereof will reveal facts underlying the existence of probable cause and
the reliability of the source of information. In many states, warrants have
customarily been issued upon an officer's naked conclusion that there was
probable cause to arrest or search. In such states, the officer is not re-
quired to reveal to the magistrate any of the facts necessary for an in-
196. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, supra note
126; Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967).
197. The cases are collected in A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 37-45 (Tent. Draft 1967) [herein-
after cited as DEFENSE SERVICES].
198. DEFENSE SERVICES recommends that counsel be provided in all criminal proceed-
ings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty, "except those types of offenses for which
such punishment is not likely to be imposed... in all proceedings arising from the initia-
tion of a criminal action against the accused, including extradition, mental competency,
post-conviction and other proceedings which are adversary in nature." Id. §§ 4.1, 4.2. It
recommends that counsel should be provided to the accused "as soon as feasible after
he is taken into custody, when he appears before a committing magistrate, or when he
is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest." Id. § 5.1.
199. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
200. See authorities collected supra note 146.
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dependent evaluation of whether probable cause exists. Such a warrant
does not meet fourth amendment requirements. States permitting such
procedures should follow the lead of Georgia2 ' and amend their statutes to
require the officer to state the basis for his conclusion.
The Supreme Court has also clearly indicated that the officer issuing the
warrant should have independent judicial discretion. 202 In some states war-
rants may be issued by mayors, court clerks, or justices of the peace 203 who
are not necessarily lawyers, and who may even be police officers.2 04
Assuming, but not conceding, the requisite degree of judicial objectivity,
it is doubtful whether many of these persons have the necessary expertise
to evaluate warrant applications under the light of the Supreme Court
cases. It is also doubtful that they always understand the role they are
expected to play. One wonders how many warrants are issued by persons
such as the assistant clerk who candidly testified that she routinely issued
warrants upon witnessing the signatures of officers. 205 The states must care-
fully consider limiting the classes of persons who may issue warrants to
individuals who combine both expertise and judicial independence.
Two years ago, the Supreme Court in Miranda20 6 laid down detailed rules
for custodial interrogation of suspects. Basically, it requires police to in-
form a suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that anything that he
says can and will be used against him, that he has a right to the advice
and presence of a lawyer, and that a lawyer will be provided for him if
he is unable to afford one.207 Furthermore, the Court said that the suspect
must be permitted to exercise his rights after he is informed of their
existence.2 08 Interrogation must normally cease if a witness indicates that
he wishes to remain silent or to consult a lawyer.209 A suspect may waive
his rights and give a statement, but the government must assume a "heavy
burden" to demonstrate that he "knowingly and intelligently" waived his
rights. 210
201. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-103.1 (Supp. 1967).
202. See authorities collected supra note 146.
203. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-25.1, 15-25.2, 18-13 (1965).
204. State v. McHone, 243 N.C. 231, 90 S.E.2d 536 (1955). This case involved an
arrest warrant; hopefully, it would not be followed today.
205. State v. Upchurch, 267 N.C. 417, 148 S.E.2d 259 (1966).
The clerk testified that: "[a]ll I can say is they come in and ask if I will witness their
signature, and I witness it." The Court properly concluded that "it seems evident from
her testimony that she does not have the slightest comprehension as to what her
legal duties and responsibilities are in connection with the issuance of a search
warrant.
Id. at 419, 148 S.E.2d at 260-61. See Katz, supra note 142, at 144.
206. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
207. Id. at 467-73.
208. Id. at 474.
209. Ibid.
210. Id. at 475-76.
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The extent to which law enforcement agencies are complying with
Miranda is unclear. Quite likely, some policemen have only a vague idea
of the warnings required by Miranda. Some law enforcement officers who
do understand the holding undoubtedly may be ignoring the decision.
Others may be following the "Dragnet" approach, by reading the warnings
as a rote exercise before interrogating as usual. In some jurisdictions, there
seems to be a genuine effort to comply with the Court's mandate. Police
practices and the effects of the warnings are now being studied in several
cities. 211
Most communities have not yet developed systems to provide counsel for
indigents at the station house. An indigent who seeks to assert his right
thus cannot consult counsel until he is presented to the court. Undoubtedly,
some defendants who initially decline to confess will decide after a few
hours in a cell to talk with the police, particularly if they cannot determine
how soon they will have a chance to consult counsel. Some of the resulting
confessions may be genuine waivers; others will be the product of coercion
induced by incommunicado confinement combined with the defendant's
lack of knowledge concerning the time that it will terminate. Usually it
will not be possible to know in which category a particular confession
should be placed. A finding of waiver under such circumstances will reduce
the Miranda doctrine to meaningless rubrics. 212
Last year the Supreme Court held that a police lineup is normally a
"critical stage" of the proceeding at which the defendant, in the absence
of waiver,21 3 must be represented by counsel. However, it also indicated that
counsel might not be required if police departments took steps which would
"eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceed-
ings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial ...... 214
There is good reason to believe that lineups in the absence of counsel
are being routinely conducted in many communities throughout the coun-
try. There is a substantial risk of contaminating a subsequent criminal
prosecution each time a defendant is identified at a lineup of the kind
traditionally conducted by the police. Again, it is necessary for the states to
211. See Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L.J. 1519 (1967); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967). Detailed studies are also being conducted by the Vera Institute
in New York, the Georgetown University Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure in
Washington, and elsewhere.
212. Cf. State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968).
213. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967). See Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem
in Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Pirr. L. REv. 65
(1967); Comment, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967).
214. United States v. Wade, supra note 213.
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take prompt action not only to protect the constitutional rights of de-
fendants, but to provide their police with the working tools which they re-
quire.
Speedy improvement is needed in many state systems of post-conviction
remedies, not only to protect the rights of the citizenry but to decrease
federal intervention in the handling of state prisoners' complaints of injus-
tice. 215 State trial judges must appreciate the importance of providing a
full hearing on any claimed violation of a federal constitutional right,
not only to be fair to the defendant, but also to protect the state proceeding
from subsequent attack in the federal courts.
Equally important is the education of state judicial administrative per-
sonnel and the improvement of their techniques. The needs of state law
enforcement, judicial, and correctional agencies must be ascertained and
proposals prepared with the object of seeking federal support.
These are only some examples of the areas in which state action is ur-
gently required. A systematic study should be conducted in all states to
determine what changes are necessary. Such studies can profit from out-
standing research now being conducted by the Ford-Foundation-supported
institutes at Georgetown University, the University of Chicago, the Univer-
sity of California, and Stanford University; the studies of the Vera Founda-
tion in New York; the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice; the work of the American Law Institute on
its Model Code for Pre-Arraignment Procedure; and the monumental re-
ports of the President's Crime Commissions.
VI. Conclusion
No reason exists for complacency in the judicial administrative system but
there is reason to be proud of the progress achieved so far. Some say that
history judges the quality of a civilization by the way in which it treats
citizens accused of crime. By this standard, America has a fair claim to
the title of the world's most enlightened nation. Others evaluate a system's
effectiveness by the extent to which it has eradicated crime. By this test,
the United States has a long way to go. Perhaps the best standard would
combine both factors and ask whether the job being done is commen-
surate with the resources at society's disposal. The current period of transi-
tion makes such a judgment difficult. In another ten years we may be in a
better position to give an answer.
215. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY
COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CoNVIcrION REME-
DIES (Tent. Draft, 1967).
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